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There a Better
FWay to Select
Montana Judges?
by Jean M. Bowman*

STATE

Jo r m e r U.S. Supreme
Court Justice Sandra
Day O’Connor warned
Am ericans recently,
“Judicial elections are
becom ing political
prizefights where
partisans and special
interests seek to install
judges w ho w ill answer
to them instead o f the law
and the Constitution.”
In a similar vein, the American Bar
Association has long urged states to
select their judges on the basis o f merit.
This essay w ill argue that Montanans
should take to heart these astute and
important observations.

What lies behind the concerns o f Justice O’Connor and the ABA? A new report compiled by Justice at Stake, a
nonpartisan group, shows that business interests spend twice as much money on state high-court elections than do all
other groups combined, including lawyers and unions. In Texas, the court system has been under close scrutiny since a
television station raised the specter o f campaign money influencing judicial decision making. In a poll o f Texas business
leaders, 70 percent expressed their uneasiness with this possibility and favored some selection system other than election.
A national poll by the Annenbeig Public Policy Center found that seven in ten voters believe that the need to raise
campaign funds could affect a judge’s rulings. A report by the Cato Institute concluded that judicial elections “become
inordinately expensive, create a perception o f impropriety, and may produce judges beholden to deep-pocketed donors
with recurring business before the court.” And in Georgia, the National Association o f Manufacturers last year spent S1.3
million, unsuccessfully, in attempting to defeat a sitting justice.
There is another side to this question. Former U.S. Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall defended the election of
judges based on their individual life experiences and values because he contended their voting patterns are traceable
to their life philosophies. The argument is pretty straightforward: If judges “make law” by judicial interpretation, then
the people should have a direct role in choosing them. The Washington, D.C.—based Federalist Society similarly argues
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that partisan judicial elections have “substantial
advantages over the alternatives, not least [because]
they provide an additional, significant measure of
self-government to voters.” The Annenberg study,
cited previously, found that nearly two in three voters
preferred to elect judges rather than have them
appointed on the basis o f merit. And Ohio voters
turned down a merit system o f selecting judges in

by the governor, a district court judge chosen by
other district judges, and two attorneys appointed
by the state supreme court — meets. Customarily,
this commission interviews applicants for the vacant
position and submits three to five names to the
governor. If the governor fails to make a selection
within 30 days, the decision passes to the chief
justice. In either case, the nomination goes to the

part because they believed appointed judges would be
too tied to the governor.
The importance o f the selection debate cannot
be overstated. The goal should be the best method

state senate, which either confirms or fails to confirm
the nominee. If the nominee is not confirmed, the

possible, that is, one that secures the independence
and legitimacy o f the judiciary and prevents conflicts
among the three branches o f government. Also, the
method o f judicial selection used — whatever it might
be — must have the support o f a majority o f the

session only every other year, some

voters. Next we ask, what method o f judicial selection
is currently in place in Montana and why?
The Montana statehood Constitution o f 1889
provided for partisan election o f judges. Anyone
meeting minimal qualifications specified in law was
eligible to run. In the late 1960s, a group calling
themselves Montana Citizens for Court Improvement
began working to reform how the state selects its
judges. Their recommendation, called The Montana
Plan, incorporated much of what had come to be
called the Missouri Plan or Merit Plan o f judicial
selection. A few years later, delegates to the 1972
Montana Constitutional Convention agreed to do away
with partisan judicial elections, but they were sharply
divided on what method to use to select judges. The
convention’s judiciary committee heard testimony
from judges, lawyers, professors, and citizens for and
against the merit system. On all proposals to change
the 1889 judiciary article, the committee split 5 to 4.
On the floor o f the convention, delegates hammered
out a middle ground between those advocating
election and those advocating appointment. That
compromise is what the state has lived with since.
The Judiciary Article o f the 1972 Montana
Constitution (Article VII), permits any person who
meets the legal qualifications for a judge to ran
in a nonpartisan election. Qualifications include
United States citizenship, residency in the state for
two years, and membership in the state bar for at
least five years before taking the bench. The 1972
Constitution provides that when a district or supreme
court vacancy occurs, the Judicial Nominating
Commission — made up o f four laypersons appointed

appointment process starts over again. Because the
Montana Legislature meets in regular
appointed judges can serve upwards
a year before the senate acts. A
nominated and confirmed judge
serves until the next general election,
at which time the judge must decide
whether to run for an elected term.
Judges who are unopposed still have
their names on the ballot and electors
are given the choice o f voting whether
or not to retain them. A referendum
on a sitting judge may be enlivened
if a challenger files and makes the
election a contested affair.
Since 1972, when the present
judicial selection system took effect,
most o f Montana’s judges and
justices have been appointed by the
governor. Most o f these appointees
have then retained office by virtue of
being unopposed in the next general
election. Elective competition,
when it has occurred, has been more
prevalent at the supreme court level
than the district court level, and
most often incumbent judges have
won by large margins. Moreover,
contestants in an open judicial race
and challengers to a sitting judge
rarely have been screened by the
Judicial Nominating Commission.
In 1940, Missouri became the first state to adopt
the merit plan o f selecting judges. But since then,
the reform has hardly taken the nation by storm.
Currently, 23 states use the system. Though the
judicial-selection debate has continued for more than
100 years, I strongly believe that Montana should take
its stand among the reform states. To explain why, we
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need to compare the merit plan to the state’s present

should keep their distance from the political stage, a

muddled system.
The merit plan has three basic elements:

venue more appropriate for legislative and executive
officials. They should have no platform in the

nomination by a nonpartisan committee on the basis

conventional sense. Surely judges are not supposed to
represent us as other public officials do. Their job is

o f merit, appointment by the governor, and retention
or dismissal by voters at periodic elections. Although
some o f the 23 states do not use all o f these features,
one feature uniformly followed is the criterion of
merit. The essence o f the judicial office — the wise,
impartial, and reasoned decision o f cases — argues
forjudges who are o f good character, bright, well
educated, broadly experienced, sharp
in analysis, accomplished in writing,
and beholden to no one.
But how does the voter know
if a judicial candidate is fair,
objective, patient, hard working,
clear thinking, and highly literate?
The short answer is that most
voters cannot determine whether
a judicial candidate possesses the
necessary qualification to be a good
judge. Because judicial elections
cannot turn on how someone would
decide a case, they focus instead on
such irrelevancies as whether the
candidate was a sports star, attends
church regularly, participates in
political party functions, or looks
like a judge. And when judicial
campaigns get down to more
“judicial” issues, some voters ask
whether an incumbent decided
for labor more often than for
management, whether the judge
has a good environmental record, or
whether the judge tends to side with
the defendant. Judicial decisions,
however, are far more complicated
than portrayed by politicians or
the press; they are colored in many
shades o f gray, not black and white.
The facts might have favored labor,
or the environmentalists argued the wrong law, or the
prosecutor couldn’t prove that the accused committed
the crime.
Justice is supposed to be blind and, therefore, judges
must be independent. They should not be politicians
raising money from favor seekers or courting votes
with promises improper or impossible to keep. They

to interpret the law and apply it to an established set
o f facts.
Scholars agree that a good constitution provides
the basic framework o f government and gives the
legislature the authority to fill in the necessary details.
As time goes forward and change becomes necessary,
necessary reforms should be brought about through
legislative action and not the cumbersome process
o f constitutional amendment. While it is clear that
the 1972 judiciary article is much shorter and less
detailed than the 1889 judiciary article (the former
does cover, in addition to the selection o f judges,
kinds o f courts, number o f justices, length o f terms,
temporary assignment o f judges, and discipline o f
judges), I believe an even shorter article would better
serve Montanans. My position is taken with full
understanding that the political likelihood o f such a
change is dim and that it is nearly impossible to prove
a link between improvement in the administration o f
justice and new constitutional language. I also readily
admit that it is difficult to find serious fault with
our judicial branch as now administered. Further, it
would be inappropriate to find fault with the men
and women who currently serve on our courts. I do,
however, question the method o f judicial selection
provided for in our state constitution. Presently, some
judges are screened and some are not; some judges
have to participate in contested elections, and some
do not. For the long term it would be better to have a
uniform and predictable selection process.
Suppose the Montana Constitution’s judiciary article
read as follows:
SECTION I. JUDICIAL POWER
Thejudicial power o f the state shall be vested in a
unified judicial system, including an appellate court and
other courts provided by law.
SECTION II. APPELLATE COURT
The appellate court shall have final statewide appellate
jurisdiction. It shall have original jurisdiction to issue,
hear, and determine all writs appropriate to the exercise of
its jurisdiction. It shall have the power to administer the
courts to assure fairness and efficiency. It shall have the
power to make all rules relating to the practice o f law and
to make procedural rules which are not inconsistent with
state law.
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SECTION III. ALL OTHER COURTS
Other courts shall have original jurisdiction in cases
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arising under the laws o f this state.
SECTION IV. JUDICIAL OFFICE
Justices and judges shall be appointed as provided by
law to serve a term not less than six years.
This scaled-down version o f a judiciary article would
allow the legislature to “fill in the blanks” to meet the
changing needs o f our state judicial system. It would
permit relatively easy change in the shape and number
o f judicial districts, jurisdiction o f the courts, and rules
o f procedure. But most importantly, it would protect
the independence o f the state judiciary by providing a
judicial appointment process, which could be designed
to incorporate any, or all, elements o f the merit plan.
There would be no judicial prizefights in Montana!

'Jean M. Bowman holds a J.D.from The University o f
Montana School o f Law and served as a member o f the
Judiciary Committee o f the 1972 Montana Constitutional
Convention.
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S

The University erf

„|WMontana

THE UNIVERSITY

Of MONTANA

PRESS

